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ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION AND THE DONATION:
A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION
INTRODUCTION
On December 3, 1967, the first human heart transplant operation was
performed in Cape Town, South Africa.' Since then, more than one hun-
dred such operations have been attempted in thirty-six medical centers in
sixteen countries. Approximately one-half of these recipients are still liv-
ing.2 Dr. Theodore Cooper of the National Heart Institute has estimated
that in America alone there are annually eighty thousand potential heart
recipients by virtue of their otherwise untreatable heart disease.' Organ
transplantation has recently been the subject of much medical, legal, and
ethical speculation, with the result being the production of many articles
emphasizing that new legal problems have been created by the medical
profession.4 This discussion will focus on legal questions arising from
the donation of human organs with the ultimate goal of creating legisla-
tive guidelines. The questions presented can be divided into those in-
volving the donor and those involving the donation. The heart trans-
plant situation has drastically changed the position of the donor be-
cause any removal of this organ must occur almost simultaneously with
death." So long as there is no clearly defined moment of death, the
1. N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1967, § A, at 1, col. 2.
2. Time, Dec. 6, 1968, at 59.
3. Statement by Theodore Cooper, M.D., Ph.D., Director Designate of the National
Heart Institute, before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on
Government Operations, United States Senate, April 1, 1968.
4. See generally Reports on S. 1. Res. 145 Before the Subcormn. on Government
Research, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1968); 114 CoNG. REc. 19 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1968)
(remarks of Senator Mondale); The Ethics of Transplants, Nat'l Observer, Jan. 22,
1968, at 22; Warwick, Organ Transplants: A Modest Proposal, Wall Street J., June 24,
1968, at 12, col. 3; Castel, Some Legal Aspects of Human Organ Transplantation in
Canada, 46 CAN. B. REv. 345 (1968); Sanders & Dukeminier, Medical Advance and the
Legal Lag: Hemodialysis and Kidney Transplantation, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 357, 394
(1968); Stickel, Organ Transplantation in Medical and Legal Perspective, 32 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 579 (1967); Note, Heart Transplants: Legal Problems and the Need for
New Legislation, 19 CAsE, W. Rs. L. REv. 1073 (1968); Note, Legal Problems in
Donation of Human Tissues to Medical Science, 21 VAND. L. REv. 352 (1968).
5. The heart is the first of the several vital organs to be transplanted. Such operations
necessarily rely on cadaver donors. Though cadavers have been used as donors in
kidney transplantation, they are not preferred. See Couch, Curran & Moore, The
Use of Cadaver Tissues in Transplantation, 271 New Eng. 1. Med. 691 (1964);
Murray, Barnes & Atkinson, Fifth Report of the Human Kidney Transplant Registry,
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potential donor has cause to worry that he may be jeopardizing his
own safety by becoming the subject of an anatomical gift." This prob-
lem, while recognized at law, is one more properly resolved by the
medical profession and much progress has been made toward an appro-
priate solution.'
A legal discussion must center on possible legislation surrounding the
donation of anatomical gifts. Questions immediately arise concerning
the procedures of donation, but of greater importance are questions
involving the use of organs when the decedent has not made a proper
disposition of his body. May a donation be made on his behalf and, if
so, under what conditions? With these questions in mind, this discussion
will explore legislative programs dealing with cadaver organs in his-
torical perspective and then propose legislative directives that harmonize
the conflicting interests involved.
HISToRIcAL BACKGROUND
At early common law there were no recognized interests in dead
bodies8 The body was deemed to come under the ecclesiastical jurisdic-
5 Transplantation 752 (1967). The success rate where cadaver donors were used has
been established at thirty to forty percent. Id. at 744. With the use of living donors
who are parents, brothers, or sisters of the recipient, the success rate is sixty-five to
seventy percent. Id. at 756. The difference in success between using a living, related
donor and using a cadaver, unrelated donor, is due to relationship and not the
fact the donor is living in one case and dead in the other. Stickel, supra note 4, at 601.
6. In Re Potter, an unreported English case in 2 BirTISH Mm. J. 394 (1963) and
The Times (London), July 26, 1963, at 9, col. 4, brought the question of time of
death before the court. Potter, suffering from a skull fracture, had been kept "alive"
for twenty-four hours after there was deemed to be irreversable brain damage, while
physicians awaited consent for donation of his kidney. When consent was given, the
respirator was turned off and Potter stopped breathing. An inquest was held to
determine when death had occurred and, whether the physicians were guilty of any-
thing by turning off the respirator. Though no action was taken, there was criticism
of the taking of the organ prior to a positive pronouncement of death.
A similar case arose recently in Sweden where a kidney was taken from an
unconscious woman suffering from a brain tumor and believed beyond therapy. Re-
ported in Biorok, On the Definitions of Death, WORLD Mm. J. 137, 138 (1967). The
donor was maintained on a respirator for thirty-six hours after the operation. Again,
when the machine was turned off there was no spontaneous breathing. The Royal
Board of Medicine said that the physician should be responsible for determining the
time of death. See Sanders and Dukeminier, supra note 4, at 408.
7. On Dec. 4, 1968, the American Medical Association set guidelines for heart
transplant cases, stipulating that two doctors (not of the transplant team) should
confirm the death of the donor. "The fact of death must be demonstrated by
adequate, current and acceptable scientific evidence in the opinion of the physicians
making the determination." Richmond Times Dispatch, Dec. 5, 1968, at 1, col. 7.
8. For an in depth review of the historical development of the law of dead bodies,
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tion which saw to its burial. Only an "emotional" interest was vested
in the family. Blackstone explained the legal significance of a corpse in
the following manner:
A shroud . . . is the property of those, whoever they were, that
buried the decedent; but stealing the corpse itself, which has no
owner (though a matter of great indecency) is no felony unless
some of the graveclothes be stolen with itY
The law could not comprehend a property interest which was incapable
of being owned, and as there was no willingness to determine ownership
in dead bodies, they were held to have "no property." This doctrine
was not tested at that time because the corpse was of no commercial
value. This was soon to change.
The early development of the science of anatomy left medical centers
in great need of cadavers and, as the law had made no provision for
their acquisition by science, a void was created and quickly filled by
grave robbers. Without contradicting Blackstone, body stealing was
soon held to be a misdemeanor. 0
In reaction to the medical needs of the period, anatomy acts were
passed 1" allowing all unclaimed bodies previously buried at public ex-
pense to be donated to science. These acts did not completely fill the
demand and body stealing continued. Finally, in Williams v. Williams,2
an interest in someone other than the public was recognized. The court,
while rejecting the concept of testamentary disposition of one's own
body, did recognize a right to custody and possession in the executor.
He was the logical one to exert the right as he had the duty to bury.
There was no litigation in this area during the first several decades of
American case law. In 1872 however, a quasi-property concept was
see Comment, Property in Corpses, 5 ST. Louis L. J. 380 (1958); Comment, The Law
of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Problems, 19 Onto ST. L.J. 455 (1958).
9. 4 W. BLAcKsro'ix, Cot ENrAlms *236; see State v. Doepke, 68 Mo. 208 (1878).
Grave robber took coffin and contents; held, larcency as to coffin only.
10. Rex v. Lynn, 100 Eng. Rep. 394 (K.B. 1788). In calling body stealing a mis-
demeanor, the court distinguished BLAcasroNE, supra note 9, which stated only that
the theft of a body was not a felony.
11. For a survey of American anatomy legislation, see Law of Dead Bodies, supra
note 8, at 475 (Appendix 1).
12. 20 Ch. D. 659 (1882). The court stated that:
The law in this country is clear, that after the death of a man, his
executors have a right to the custody and possession of his body (although
they have no property in it) until it is properly buried. It follows that a
man cannot by will dispose of his dead body. Id. at 665.
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advanced by the Rhode Island court.13 This property interest, though
amounting to essentially the English custody and possession,14 was an
attempt to guarantee the right to burial without allowing the broad
incidents of ownership associated with property. Thus, there developed
in both systems an interest upon which a third person could maintain
an action for interference with the remains? 5
The common law thus developed both a public interest, which ex-
panded with scientific advancement, and a vested interest in a third
person, either executor or next-of-kin. Nowhere however, was the
right to dispose of one's own remains established. It was even suggested
that, in the absence of statute, testamentary disposition was not per-
mitted. 1 English courts consistently refused to enforce testamentary
bequests although American courts later divided on the issue.
MODERN LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT
As evidenced by the early anatomy acts,' 7 legislative development has
been responsive to medical innovation. First, the early sophistication
in anatomy study resulted in an onslaught of autopsy laws.', These were
justified as being in the public interest because they allowed autopsy
only to determine the cause of death when it was surrounded by
suspicious circumstances. Also, the interruption with the normal dis-
position of the body was only temporary.
Next, following several successes with skin grafts and corneal trans-
plantation,.9 ten states adopted legislation allowing voluntary testamen-
13. Pierce v. Proprietors of Swan Point Cemeteries, 10 R.I. 227 (1872). This concept
of quasi-property was explained as follows:
There is a duty imposed by the universal feelings of mankind, to be
discharged by someone towards the dead, a duty, and we may also say
a right to be protected from violation; and it may therefor be considered
as a sort of quasi-property, and it would be discreditable to any system
of law not to provide a remedy in such a case. Id. at 238.
14. Williams v. Williams, 20 Ch. D. 659, 665 (1882).
15. In England it was clear that such a right vested in the executor, but in America
the executor was not named until the reading of the will which often was after the
uneral. The case of Pettigrew v. Pettirey_ _207 Pa. 313, 56 A. 878 (190), settled
" the question in America as the court developed the next-of-kin chain to determine
in whom the right vested.
16. 20 VA. L. REv. 478 (1934).
17. Annot., 48 A.L.R. 1209 (1927).
18. See Law of Dead Bodies, supra note 8, at 475 (app. 1).
19. Corneal transplantation was the logical pioneer in this field because the rejection
potential was virtually non-existant. See Paton, Corneal Transplantation: A Historic
Review, 33 AM. J. OPHTHAL. 1, 3-5 (1950).
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tary donation of one's body for certain scientific endeavors.20 For the
first time, the law recognized a legally vested interest in the decedent
to dispose of his remains.
During the 1950's and early 1960's, the number of states having
donation statutes rose sharply from ten to forty-two. 2' This increase was
primarily a reaction to the first kidney transplant in 195422 and the
many subsequent successes.13 As the living were generally used as
donors,24 new legal questions emerged involving informed consent, donor
insurance rates, and workman's compensation rights. Although these
problems suggested legislation directed toward the living, kidney trans-
plantation, by awakening the public to the potential of such a medical
technique, created an awareness of the need for donation statutes. The
statutes which were passed were much like the initial ten and, while
broadening the legislative base, added little in originality.
20. ALA. CODE tit. 22, § 184(1) (1958) (adopted 1947); CAL. HEALH & SAFETY
CODE § 7100 (West 1955) (adopted 1947); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:2351 (1963)
(adopted 1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2881 et seq. (1964) (adopted 1951);
MoNT. REv. CODES ANN. S 69.2311 et seq. (1967) (adopted 1943); NEv. REv. STAT. §
451.440 et seq. (1963) (adopted 1911); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4201 (McKinney 1964)
(adopted 1881); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90.216.1 et seq. (1965) (adopted 1951); ORa. REv.
STAT. § 97.132 et seq. (1961) (adopted 1947); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 68.08.250
etseq. (1962) (adopted 1909).
21. ALAs. STAT. § 13.05.035 (1962); AIuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-841 et seq. (1956);
Ag.i STAT. ANN'J. S 82-406 et seq. (1960); CoLo. Rzv. STAT. ANN. § 91-3-5 et seq. (1963);
CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 19-139 (Supp. 1965); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 736-08 et seq. (1963);
GA. CODE ANN. § 88.2001 et seq. (Supp. 1967); HAwA-I REv. LAWS § 64-14 (Supp.
1965); ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 3, § 42(a) (Smith-Hurd 1961); IND. ANN. STAT. § 6-510
et seq. (1967); IowA CODE ANN. § 142.12 (Supp. 1966); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
5 311.352-56 (1963); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 149 (1965); MAss. GENt. LAWS ch. 113,
§ 7-10 (Acts 1967); Mici. STAT. ANN. § 14.523 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 525.18 (Supp. 1967); Miss. AcTs H.B. No. 1070 (1966); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.310,
194.190 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REv. STAT. § 71-1339 et seq. (Supp. 1965); N.J. REv. STAT.
5 26:6-51 (1964); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-11-1 et seq. (Supp. 1967); N.D. CENT. CODE
5 23-06-01 (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 105 et seq. (1964); PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 5001
(1964); R.I GEN. LAWS ANN. § 23-42-1 (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-701 (1962);
S.D. CODE § 27.1302 (1939); TENN. CODE ANN. 32-601 et seq. (Supp. 1967); TEX. REV.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-1 (1960); VA. CODE ANN. 5 32-364.1 (Supp. 1966); W. VA.
CODE ANN. S 16-19-1 (Supp. 1967); WIs. STAT. ANN. 5 155-06 (Supp. 1967). See also,
D.C. CODE ANN. 2-251 et seq. (Supp. 1966).
22. At Peter Bent Brigham Hospital in Boston, a healthy kidney from one twin
was successfully transplanted into the other who was dying of kidney failure. Merrill,
Murray, Harrison & Guild, Successful Homotransplantation of the Human Kidney
Between Idential Twins, 160 J.A.M.A. 277 (1956).
23. Well over a thousand kidney transplants have been performed on patients
throughout the world during the past fifteen years, with the majority occurring
during the past five years. See Murray, Barnes & Atkinson, supra note 5, at 752.
24. See generally supra note 5.
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At this time, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws began drafting the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act which
will shortly be presented to the states for approval. Generally, it takes
the best and often the majority view of the forty-two existing statutes
and draws them together in one concise document. Although its ap-
proval coincides with the recent transplant operations, the act relies
heavily on the status of the law prior to heart transplantation and
cannot fairly be called heart transplant legislation.
The only legislative developments to occur since the heart transplants
are two state statutes6 which adopt the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
in its present tentative form27 and a Virginia statute s giving limited
donative authority to the State's chief medical examiner in cases where
the decedent comes under his jurisdiction.
PRESENT STATUS OF DONATION LEGISLATION
A review of the donation law in general, with specific emphasis upon
the "transplant states," 29 and the treatment under the Uniform Anatomi-
cal Gift Act30 is necessary at this point.
Who may execute a gift?
The UAGA adopts the majority view stating that anyone "... of
sound mind and 18 years of age or more may give all or any part of his
body." "' Fourteen states increase the age to twenty-one while five states
25. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act [hereinafter cited as U.A.G.A.] was drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and by it
approved and recommended for enactment at its Annual Conference meeting in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 22-31, 1968. The Act, including prefatory note and
comments, was approved by the American Bar Association at its meeting in Phila-
delphia, August 7, 1968. A similar act has been proposed in Canada. See Castel,
supra note 4.
26. KAN. STAT. ANN. art. 32, 65-3201 et seq. (Supp. 1968); MD. ANN. CoDE art. 43,
149 (h-s) (Supp. 1968).
27. Statson, The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 23 Bus. LAWYER 919, 920 (1968).
28. VA. CoDE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1968).
29. The states of Virginia, Texas, California, New York, Massachusetts, and Min-
nesota either have performed or are equipped to perform transplants in their medical
centers.
30. For a detailed discussion of the U.A.G.A., see U.A.G.A. with prefatory note
and comment; Stason, supra note 27 at 919 et seq.; Stickel, supra note 4, at 606; 21
VA N. L. REv., supra note 4, at 364-66.
31. U.A.G.A. S 2(a).
[Vol. 10:975
ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION
do not limit the donor at all. 2 Seven other states use competency to write
a will as a standard. Virginia and Massachusetts follow the twenty-one
and of sound mind school with Massachusetts adding the further restric-
don, ".... and not under the influence of narcotic drugs." 33 The New
York statute is in accord with the UAGA, while the Minnesota 4 and
Texas35 statutes vary slightly.
Though not included in the provisions of most states, the view that
"the person having the right to a body for burial may likewise consent
to such use of the body or any part thereof," 2 6 has been adopted and
expanded by the UAGA.37
To whom may a gift be made?
Though six states place no limit on the possible recipients, most
statutes explicitly state either to whom or for what purpose donation
may be made. Virginia and Minnesota list the possible donees while the
statutes of New York, Massachusetts, and California are purpose di-
rected. New York and Massachusetts further state that any such dona-
tions must be made without compensation.38 The UAGA attempts "to
achieve a maximum of clarity and precision while assuring flexibility," 3 9
by listing both possible donees and general purposes.
Manner of execution
The UAGA and the states generally allow such donation to be
part of the will of a decedent, effective immediately without awaiting
probate. Otherwise, properly attested documents, deeds, or oral declara-
tions can be used to effectuate the giftfi40
32. These jurisdictions are Arizona, Illinois, Indiana, Nebraska, North Carolina,
Oregon, and the District of Columbia.
33. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 113, § 7 (Supp. 1968)
34. MnN. STAT. Am. § 525.18(2) (Supp. 1967) (anyone not a minor).
35. Tzx. Rzv. Cv. STAT. art. 4590.1 (1960) (anyone of legal age).
36. VA. CODE Air. § 32-364.1 (Supp. 1968).
37. U.A.G.A. § 2 (b).
38. "No donee shall pay or promise to pay any compensation to any person for
such gift." MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 113, § 7 (Supp. 1968). "A person who directs the
manner in which his body shall be disposed of after his death . . . shall receive no
remuneration or other things of value... " N.Y. PUm. HFALTH LAW § 4201 (1)
(McKinney Supp. 1968-69).
39. UA.Ga . § 3, Comment.
40. Id. § 4.
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Amendment or revocation of the gift
Only about one-half of the states having donation statutes make any
provision for the subsequent revocation or amendment of the gift.
Where such provision is included, the statute takes one of three forms:
(1) It states that the law of wills applies-Minnesota; (2) It states that
the manner of revocation is identical to the manner of execution-Vir-
ginia and New York; or (3) It specifically duplicates the provisions of
one of the above-California and Texas. The UAGA combines these
approaches in an effort to make revocation easier. The rationale is that
one will be more likely to make the gift in the first place if he can
easily revoke it.4 1
Although the above classification is not all-inclusive, each legislative
act deals with these general questions. Nowhere however, except in
Virginia transplant act of 1968, has an attempt been made to effectuate
the donation of organs in reaction to the recent advances in organ trans-
plantation.
The Virginia statute
The 1968 session of the Virginia General Assembly passed an act
entitled, "Authority of Chief Medical Examiner or deputies to provide
organs for transplant." 42 The act gives the State Medical Examiner or
his deputies the right to provide organs from a dead body for trans-
plantation in a case where the body is under their jurisdiction and there
is insufficient time to contact the next-of-kin of the decedent and still
maintain the viability of the organ to be transplanted and no known ob-
jection is forseen.
The obvious difference in this and the donation statutes or the
UAGA is that it deals specifically with cases where there is no consent
given by the decedent or next-of-kin. Its application is restricted to cases
41. Id. § 6, Comment.
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-46.1 (Supp. 1968) states:
In any case where a patient is in immediate need for an internal organ
as a transplant, the Chief Medical Examiner or his deputies where a
decedent comes under their jurisdiction; who may provide a suitable
organ for transplant and there is insufficient time to contact the next
of kin of the decedent in order to maintain the viability of the organ
to be transplanted, and no known objection by the next of kin is forseen
by the Chief Medical Examiner or his deputies; the Chief Medical
Examiner or his deputies may in their discretion where providing the
organ for transplant will not interfere with subsequent course of investiga-
tion or autopsy provide such organ on the request of the transplanting
surgeon.
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where the decedent comes under the jurisdiction of the Medical
Examiner which is defined in Virginia as, "... any case of sudden, vio-
lent or suspicious death." 43
The fact that the act is so restricted, and is further refined to cover
only cases where an emergency recipient is available, justifies its being
called the first heart transplant statute in the United States.M Though it
touches only a small amount of potential cadavers, it reaches the largest
and most advantageous group from a transplant standpoint because of
the two limitations on the source of cadaver organs. First, many fatal
diseases are systematic and damage much more than one organ. More-
over, persons dying of old age may have normal but aged organs that,
while capable of functioning, would soon wear out if transplanted into
a younger person. Thus, automobile accident and homicide victims pro-
vide the best source of cadaver donors. Without this act, organs cannot
be taken from bodies without the specific permission of the next-of-kin
which greatly reduces the availability of cadaver donors.
A PROPOSAL
Through the development of legislation, case law, and public senti-
ment, three distinct interests in the dead body have emerged; that of
the decedent, his next-of-kin, and the public. Over the years, each has
enjoyed varying degrees of prominence with the interest of the dece-
dent and the public recently eroding the duty-orientated interest of the
survivors. In fashioning legislation, it is necessary to consider the rela-
tive importance of each of these interests.
Legislation and the decedent
Although there is little case law, the law and the public have always
been sympathetic toward the decedent where he requested a particular
treatment of his remains. The court stated in Pettigrew v. Pettigrew,
"The wishes of the testator are always given respectful attention." C5 It
is not surprising then, that legislation almost universally gives him such
a right. Any proposal must advance the support of the testator's own
intentions for to do otherwise would be contra to the public conscience.
There still exists a problem where the decedent dies without evidenc-
ing any intention concerning organ donation. There has never been
43. Id. § 19.1-43 (1950).
44. Richmond Times Dispatch, Aug. 4, 1968, § B, at 1, col. 6.
45. 207 Pa. 213, 56 A. 878, 879 (1904).
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stated a clear legal presumption that failure to make contrary declaration
indicated a preference to be buried but such a presumption apparently
exists. The concept of burial is closely related to Christian teaching and
has, at times, been insisted upon. The traditional view of judgment day
bringing forth a re-union of the body and soul gave credence to the con-
cept that the body should be committed intact.46 The medical profession
initially did not exert much pressure on the church as the need of
science for cadavers, over and above the unclaimed dead, was rather
slight. Today, reformed religious thinking has repudiated any theological
concepts which formerly invalidated donation.4 Moreover, there is a
greater need for donations than has ever existed before. Any social
stigma associated with anatomical donation has been removed as is evi-
denced by a recent Gallup Poll report indicating that seven persons out
of every ten would make an anatomical gift."' Today, there is room for
a different presumption.
Accordingly, legislation must give the decedent autonomous control
over the disposition of his remains, but where he fails to exercise his
vested right the presumption should be changed to favor donation or,
at very least, there should be no presumption at all.
Legislation and the next-of-kin
The rights and interests of the next-of-kin in the remains of the de-
cedent are the historic result of a pre-existing duty to bury. These have
become entrenched however in legal thought and cannot be removed.
Presently, there is an affirmative duty on the medical staff to seek out
the next-of-kin and secure consent before proceeding with the organ
removal. This is consistent with the presumptions of burial where
decedent died without evidencing intent. Logically, if the presumption
of burial is changed as proposed, the affirmative duty should shift from
the medical staff to the next-of-kin. That is, the surgeons can proceed
46. For a summary of the religious development in this area, see Sanders & Duke-
minier, supra note 4, at 404.
47. In 1956, Pope Pius XII, in an address to The International Meeting of Opthol-
mologists, declared that there was no moral or religious objection to the post-mortem
removal of the cornea for grafting purposes. Implicit therein is approval of post-
mortem removal of other organs for transplantation. See Reich, Medico-Moral
Problems and the Principle of Totality: A Catholic Vie'wpoint, MEDmico-MoP.AL E-mcs
FoR A HosprrAL MINisTRY, VA CHAPLAIN WoutsHops, 29, 32 (1967). See also Dolgin,
Medico-Moral Problems: A Jewish Viewpoint, MEDIcO-MORAL E-ncs FOR A HosPrrAL
MiNisTRY, VA CHAPLAIN WORKSHOPS, 23, 27 (1967).
48. N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1968, § A., at 18, col. 3.
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under the assumption that the donation is consented to with the affirma-
tive duty on the next-of-kin to deny such consent. Before making this
assumption, the surgeon would (1) be aware of no known objection to
the donation and (2) be required to know that the next-of-kin had
actual knowledge of the death. In cases where the next-of-kin did not
have actual knowledge, the surgeon would be required to take reason-
able means, tempered by the situation, to effect notification. If reason-
able means failed, then a presumption favoring donation would control.
Thus, in summary, the next-of-kin, by coming foward and exercising
it, would have a vested interest in the remains of the decedent; other-
wise, the interest would be presumed waived. Further, if the next-of-
dn could not be notified by a reasonable attempt, the presumption in
favor of donation would apply.
Legislation and the. public interest
The public interest in cadaver donation is the result of the vast ex-
pansion of medical science. Although the scientific use of cadavers is
in part responsible for this expansion, it is unfortunate that when science
has used cadavers to benefit science it has not been in the public interest.
Only where the public benefits directly can such medical activity be
said to be in the public interest and thus subject to legislation.49
Criminal autopsy has been determined to be of such vital public in-
terest as to be superior to any other claim to the remains. Logically,
if there is no objection to autopsy, why should there be an objection to
organ removal? Transplantation is also vital to the public interest and,
where that power vested in the decedent or his next-of-kin is not exer-
cised, the public interest should control. This is the thrust of the Vir-
ginia transplant act.
Thus, effective legislation should uphold as paramount the interest
of the decedent and give him simple, mechanical means to exercise his
interest. Where there is no exercise however, legislation should shift the
presumption to favor donation. Secondary to the decedent's interest
49. Etheredge v. Norfolk, 148 Va. 795, 139 S.E. 508 (1927) the court, quoting from
In re Jacobs, stated:
When a health law is challenged in the courts as unconstitutional on
the ground that it arbitrarily interferes with personal liberty and private
property without due process of law, the courts must be able to see that
it has at least in fact some relation to the public health, that the public
health is the end actually aimed at, and it is appropriate and adapted to
that end. In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 50 Am. Rep. 636. Id. at 799, 139
S.E. at 512.
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should be the interest of the next-of-kin, but there should be an affirma-
tive duty to exercise it. Finally, the public interest should be corre-
spondingly greater in cases of transplant.
Many questions can effectively be answered by the adoption of the
UAGA. In the areas of the right of the decedent to make a gift during
life and, the right of the next-of-kin to do so on decedent's behalf, the
statute combines the best of all progressive legislation.
Threatened litigation in Richmond, Virginia and Houston, Texas how-
ever shows that the UAGA does not complete the job. In Richmond, a
transplant operation was attacked by the brother of the donor who
denied that the body was unclaimed and stated that no consent was
given.50 In the Houston situation, the heart of a homicide victim was
removed for transplanting before an autopsy was performed.5 ' Neither
of these problems could be disposed of under the UAGA. There is
general concensus that younger donors afford the recipient a greater
chance for survival. The majority of these donors become available due
to some accidental death. Usually there is not time to contact the next-
of-kin and in most cases, the decedent will not have made a previous
anatomical disposition. It is in this area that the shifting presumptions
and duties must be given effect. To this end, the Virginia transplant
act complements the UAGA.
CONCLUSION
Legislation should be uniformly adopted which (1) grants an ex-
peditious manner for one to make disposition of his remains, (2) re-
solves all conflict in favor of decedent where any such disposition has
been made, and, (3) does not presume any intention to be buried where
none is given. Further, in such cases where the decedent has not spoken,
the right should vest in the next-of-kin who would have an affirmative
50. At the Medical College of Virginia, the heart of Bruce 0. Tucker was used
in a transplant operation May 25, 1968, after a reasonable search failed to uncover
his next of kin. Later a brother denied that the body was unclaimed and stated that
no consent was given for the transplant. No litigation has followed to date. Rich-
mond Times Dispatch, May 27, 1968, at 1, col. 1.
51. The question in Houston involved a homicide victim donor. The heart of
Clarence Nicks, the donor, was kept going for three hours after the county medical
examiner ruled that he was dead. The heart was then removed prior to an autopsy
being performed. The questions raised were: 1) Could an autopsy be considered
complete with the heart missing? 2) If not, could it affect the prosecution and
defense in a murder trial? and, 3) Could the heart transplant team be prosecuted for
interfering with a planned autopsy by removing a homicide victim's heart? Washing-
ton Post, May 13, 1968, § A, at 6, col. 1.
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duty to exercise the right in order to preserve it. Otherwise, a presump-
tion in favor of donation would control. This can best be implemented
by the adoption of the UAGA, as proposed, amended only to include
a provision similar to the Virginia transplant statute.
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